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Abstract  
 
Using panel data for the United States 2001 – 2011, the authors examine general 
differences in charitable giving between union members, free-riders, and the non-unionized. 
Results indicate that union members are more likely to give and to give more to charity relative 
to the non-unionized, whereas free-riders are the least generous. Similar effects are found when 
examining joining a union or becoming a free-rider: joining a union positively affects charitable 
giving, while moving into free-riding makes individuals’ behavior less charitable. Evidence also 
suggests that the positive effect of union membership on giving does not diminish over time. 
Taken together, these results provide new solid evidence that union membership generates civic 
engagement in the form of charitable behavior, but also suggest the need to further investigate 
the civic behavior of free-riders. 
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Existing literature on the role of organized labor in civil society has long suggested that 
union members are more engaged citizens than those who do not belong to unions. While 
considerable evidence exists that the effect of union membership on political participation, such 
as voting and other actions meant to shape political agendas and outcomes, is positive and 
significant (Delaney, Masters and Schwochau 1988; Flavin and Radcliff 2011; Kerrissey and 
Schofer 2013; Radcliff and Davis 2000; Radcliff 2001; Rosenfeld 2010; Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995), theoretical and empirical controversy still surrounds the question whether – and, if 
so, how – labor union membership affects pro-social behavior such as volunteering and 
charitable giving. For instance, Zullo (2011) shows that union members are more likely to 
volunteer and to make charitable donations to community organizations. In contrast, Kerrissey 
and Schofer (2013) show that union members are more likely to donate to political causes, but 
that union membership does not affect donations to general charities. Moreover, while some 
studies emphasize unions’ role in mobilizing individuals for political and civic engagement 
(Bryson et al. 2013; Freeman 2003, Juravich and Shergold 1988; Lamare 2010a, b), others 
wonder whether deep-seated predispositions as well as private experiences with civic and 
altruistic behavior trump the more collective experience that results from membership in a civic 
association (Portes 2000; Uslaner 2000). The controversy surrounding the civic participation of 
union members is recently amplified by the recognition that labor union activity has weakened 
considerably in the past decades (Brady, Baker, and Finnigan 2013; Western and Rosenfeld 
2011) and that this decline might also affect unions’ potential for civic engagement (Putnam 
2000; Radcliff 2001; Sojourner 2013).  
Furthermore, studies that investigated the link between union membership and more 
specific pro-social engagement, such as volunteering and charitable activities, have either been 
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conducted at an aggregate level or have relied on cross-sectional data. Aggregate level studies, 
however, cannot directly account for individual choice. Yet, to the extent that charitable giving is 
the result of individual choice, it is important to understand how being a union member affects 
individuals’ decisions to give and how much to contribute. In turn, cross-sectional data cannot 
account for self-selection biases because they do not measure variation in charitable engagement 
due to individuals joining or leaving a labor union. Only if we account for such independent 
effects and their duration, can we conclude that labor unions play a role in enhancing civic 
engagement and that they are not just indicators of the presence of civic values.  
 To address previous limitations, this paper uses data from the Philanthropy Panel Study 
(PPS)1 component of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a long-running panel survey 
of a representative sample of United States households (Wilhelm et al. 2001). PPS provides 
information regarding charitable giving over time, from 2001 to 2011, both incidence of giving 
and amount of charitable contribution by union members and non-members. We use the panel 
structure of the data to examine selection bias more effectively than in previous studies, i.e. 
whether union members have characteristics that correlate with giving as opposed to changes in 
propensity to get involved in charitable giving as a result of union membership. In addition, the 
data includes rich information which allows us to control for a large number of factors that could 
affect charitable activity. An unique advantage of the data is that it allows us to compare 
charitable giving by union members not only against charitable contributions of those who do not 
belong to a union, but also against free-riders – employees whose jobs are covered by a union 
contract but who choose not to formally join that union. This comparison allows us to investigate 
potential civic spillover effects from union members to those with whom they come in contact. 
If, for instance, members and free-riders give more than employees who do not work in a 
                                                 
1 The Philanthropy Panel Study (PPS) was formerly known as the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS).  
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unionized workplace, this could constitute evidence that the presence of unions in an 
organization matters and that civic contagion happens from members to free-riders. If the 
opposite is true, that free-riders are the least charitable category, then the presence of unions 
indeed creates pockets of prosocial behavior but does not necessarily ensure overall higher civic 
behavior in an organization. Moreover, because the longitudinal nature of our data allows us to 
isolate within-person effects from between-category effects, we are able to make stronger 
statements regarding spill-over effects. 
Labor Unions and Charitable Giving 
Industrial relations scholars have generally predicted a positive association between 
union activity and civic engagement, including volunteering and giving. Two arguments support 
this prediction. First, a tradition that goes back to the work of the Fabian pioneers Sidney and 
Beatrice Webb (1897) describes labor unions as a necessary force to rebalance the unequal 
distribution of power within the workplace and society at large (see also Western and Rosenfeld 
2011). While this characterization emphasizes unions’ role as “instrumental organizations” 
(Gordon and Babchuk 1959) that seek to achieve gains for members primarily via political 
engagement, it also suggests that unions often work together with other community groups and 
organizations to advance a broader range of social issues (Frege, Heery, and Turner 2004; 
Niessen 2004). Indeed, a close look at the American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) reveals ongoing partnerships with a wide range of 
community-based organizations, charities and grass-root groups. In one of the few studies to link 
labor union presence in a community with the incidence and level of charitable giving to one of 
the AFL-CIO partners, the United Way, Zullo (2011) finds that community union member 
density and the number of union organizations per square mile have a positive and significant 
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influence on aggregate community charitable giving. Similarly, Zullo (2013) finds that union 
density is positively correlated to volunteering related to neighborhood development activities. 
Overall, this evidence suggests that unions often act as a catalyst not only for political, but also 
for apolitical civic engagement (Zullo 2013) by exposing union members to civic causes in 
which they can further engage as individuals.  
The second argument concerns the civic behavior of individual members as a result of 
their social experiences. Regardless of union partnership with community organizations, union 
members are more likely to volunteer and give because of the specific ways in which they 
socialize. The argument is an extension of Putnam’s thesis that participation in civic 
organizations and associations instills a sense of shared responsibility for collective endeavors – 
“developing the I into We” (Putnam 1995) – and thus fosters more volunteering and 
philanthropy. To the extent that labor unions represent an important locus of civic connectedness 
at work (Putnam 2000: 80-81), and given recent evidence that in the U.S. the workplace 
represents an important source of volunteer referral (Brudney and Gazley 2006), union members 
are expected to display more charitable behavior. Indeed, a cross-sectional analysis of 
community involvement (volunteering, attending community meetings, helping with a 
neighborhood project and donating) confirms that union members are more engaged and donate 
more often than non-members (Zullo 2011).     
Despite evidence of the positive association between union membership and charitable 
giving, some issues merit a closer scrutiny. First, the number of studies which test for this 
association is still limited, a scarcity explained by the fact that much of the recent research on 
unions’ civic engagement has focused on political engagement, such as voting (e.g. Bryson et al. 
2014; Freeman 2003; Lamare 2010a, b; Sojourner 2013). Second, recent evidence shows that 
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although union members are more likely to join community organizations, they are not 
necessarily giving more time or money to these organizations (Kerrissey and Schofer 2013). This 
suggests that the relationship between union membership and charitable giving is still not 
sufficiently understood. In particular, the type of data – case studies, aggregate effects or cross-
sectional samples – does not allow for making a strong causality argument.  
In an aggregate framework, it is not clear for instance whether the labor unions’ 
contribution to charity is higher because union members are generally more likely to give or 
because those who give make a larger contribution, thus offsetting the lack of involvement by 
others. In other words two distinct questions need to be answered: first, are individual members 
more likely to give, and, second, are they also likely to give more than non-members? Another 
limitation of aggregate data is that it does not allow for saying whether the pattern observed for 
contributions to the United Way (Zullo 2011), i.e. higher contributions from areas with higher 
labor union density, is specific for partners of the AFL-CIO or whether it is present for charities 
in general. A more general result would render validity to the social capital thesis which 
proposes that membership positively affects prosocial behavior. In addition, accounting for 
charitable giving more generally takes care of an important self-selection issue: those who do not 
agree with labor unions’ values in general (e.g. free-riders) may not like to contribute to a union 
endorsed cause, but they could be influenced by the giving experience of their unionized 
colleagues and engage with charity more generally. Understanding whether spillover effects 
extend to others with whom union members interact at work may shed light on the mechanisms 
through which unions create civic engagement. Finally, cross-sectional studies cannot rule out 
another self-selection aspect: people with more altruistic and civic inclinations may be more 
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likely to become union members. Longitudinal data like the data used in this study can mitigate 
this aspect by accounting for variation in charitable giving before and after joining a union.  
Why Does Labor Union Experience Matter for Giving 
Current research diverges as to why individuals engage in helping behavior, of which 
charitable giving is one instance (see Penner et al. 2005 for a review; Wiepking and Maas 2009; 
Wilson 2000). One common explanation is that the social contexts in which individuals are 
embedded affect the likelihood and degree of involvement in helping behavior. As such, 
individuals who are embedded in social networks due to their membership in civic institutions 
and associations are more likely to volunteer time and money (Hodgkinson and Weitzman 1996; 
Putnam 2000). Moreover, to the extent that these institutions promote values of morality, caring 
and compassion, the members become sensitive to causes congruent with such values. 
Embeddedness in social networks rich in civic values could enhance charitable behavior through 
a number of mechanisms.  
First, decision to participate in charitable giving is contingent on individuals knowing 
about a range of charitable causes. Numerous studies have shown that people are more likely to 
volunteer and give if they are aware of others’ needs or even asked directly to contribute 
(Bekkers and Wiepking 2011 for a review; Freeman 1997; Hodgekinson and Weitzman 1996). 
Awareness, however, is a function of one’s social network. As participation in civic 
organizations and associations creates opportunities for individuals to meet other members, it 
increases the size of their network. An increase in size is often associated with an increase in 
network diversity. Taken together, network size and diversity increase the chance that an 
individual will become aware of a variety of charitable options in which other members 
participate. To the extent that, aside from professional organizations, labor unions offer the most 
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common loci of connecting at work, it is likely that union members will learn about charitable 
opportunities and needs from their colleagues.  
Second, according to social influence theories, individuals are more likely to follow the 
actions of those with whom they identify, such as peers and role models (Bandura 1977; Salancik 
and Pfeffer 1978; Turner 1991). Social influence is stronger between co-members in an 
organization than between members and non-members because members tend to perceive those 
inside the organization as more similar to themselves than those who do not belong to the 
organization (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001; Tajfel 1982). Thus, one would expect 
union members to be more influenced by co-members than by non-members. Moreover, repeated 
interactions with other members increase one’s sense of identification. For instance, members 
participate in a number of militant actions such as strikes or slowdowns, which require high 
intensity participation and high interaction among members, thus making the identity of union 
members more salient (Kelly and Kelly 1994; Klandermans 1986). Those with lower levels of 
involvement in the union are still likely to interact with other members during formal and 
informal meetings and discussions on a range of issues in which unions are involved. All those 
instances represent not only opportunities to interact with others, but also moments in which the 
member identity is shaped. Thus, when members are exposed to the charitable acts of their 
colleagues with whom they identify they are more likely to engage in charitable behavior. 
Moreover, labor unions collectively support community organizations and organize charitable 
drives for specific causes (Zullo 2011) and actively promote acting together and helping 
employees in need, thus, sensitizing the employees to collective social issues. Witnessing the 
charitable act of the associations with which they identify makes members more inclined to 
consider giving (Booth, Park, and Glomb 2009; Bommer, Miles, and Grover 2003). At the limit, 
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pressure to conform to peers’ behavior, especially for cases in which contributions to charity 
drives are visible, could also affect members’ decisions to get involved.  
The third mechanism through which social networks affect charitable giving concerns 
their potential to foster trust and generalized reciprocity (Putnam 1995) that extends giving to 
those outside one’s immediate social circle. Networks of formal relations among members of an 
organization are conduits of more informal future relations (Putnam 2000: 121; Wilson and 
Musick 1997). In turn, informal interactions create opportunities to give and receive help, thus 
not only creating trust among the members but also encouraging attention to others’ needs and 
welfare (Putnam 2000: 117). To the extent that labor unions are important vehicles to redressing 
economic inequalities inside and outside the workplace, union members are likely to pay 
attention to the working and living conditions of those with whom they interact as well as of 
members of their wider community (Western and Rosenfeld 2011). As individuals understand 
that their own problems are similar to the problems of others outside their immediate social 
circle they feel more motivated to help others by volunteering or giving (Roßteutscher 2008).   
Finally, unions play an important screening function by reducing the perceived risk of 
contributing to a fraudulent charity. A charity recommended either by the union or by a number 
of union colleagues is more likely to be perceived as trustworthy. Related, to the extent that a 
charity is supported by the union, it may become easier for members to contribute to that charity 
either through less formal collective activities such as paycheck deductions. Taken together, the 
mechanisms analyzed above suggest that, due to their different social experience at work, union 
members are more likely to give to charity and, by the same token, to give more than non-
unionized workers. Next, we turn to the case of free-riders.  
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Free-riders and Giving Behavior 
Free-riders are employees whose jobs are covered by a union contract but who choose not 
to formally join their union (Budd 2012). As of 2015, 25 U.S. states have outlawed union and 
agency shops by passing right-to-work laws that make union membership and paying dues 
voluntary and prohibit this from being a workplace mandate. Right-to-work laws give workers 
the choice to become dues paying union members, provided that a union is present at their 
workplace. At the same time, this ‘open shop’ model provides incentives for free-riding, as 
workers who are not union members enjoy the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement 
without joining the union and without paying for these benefits (Budd 2012; Haile, Bryson and 
White 2015).  
In non-right-to-work states, unions attempt to negotiate union or agency shops into their 
collective bargaining agreements. Yet, legally all unionized workplaces can only be agency 
shops due to the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that union shop clauses can only be enforced as 
agency shops (NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734 [1963]). This has opened the door to free-
riding in non-right-to-work states as well. Specifically, employees in non-right-to-work 
unionized workplaces can choose not to be members and exercise their U.S. Supreme Court 
sanctioned Beck rights (1988) by only financially contributing to the union the proportion of 
union dues that covers representation associated to collective bargaining and contract 
administration. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also allows employees to opt out of 
union membership and to not pay dues directly to the union if employees can evidence that union 
association is in violation of their religious beliefs.  
A special case is represented by those working in the public sector, and in particular U.S. 
Federal Government employees. The law in most right-to-work states covers both private and 
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public sector workers, with a handful of these states either having no specific mention to public 
sector employees in their statute or legally banning public employees from collective bargaining 
altogether (Sanes 2014). Indiana and Wisconsin are two right-to-work state exceptions. Indiana 
is the only state that has its private sector covered under right-to-work legislation while its public 
sector generally functions under non-right-to-work status (IC 22-6-6-1, Sec. 1.4; also see Sanes 
2014). Wisconsin covers most public workers in its right-to-work statute with the exception of 
some public safety employees and municipal transit workers as covered in the 2011 Act 10 
(Budget Repair Bill) and Act 32 (Biennial Budget Bill; see Onsager 2015). Regarding U.S. 
Federal Government employees, unions representing these public sector employees function 
under open shop rules, and, thus, union membership is not a condition of employment for federal 
employees. Hence, non-right-to-work U.S. states and the District of Columbia can have 
additional free-riders from federal public sector employees choosing not to become union 
members yet benefiting from union representation in their workplace. 
The presence of free-riders working alongside union members creates a good 
experimental condition for understanding the extent to which labor unions affect not only the 
giving behavior of members but also the giving behavior of others with whom members interact 
at work. As far as we are aware, the existing literature on social capital has not explicitly 
considered this aspect, although some evidence of spillover effects from unions to the wider 
community have been recently proposed by Zullo (2013). By investigating how free-riders’ 
charitable behavior compares to the behavior of their unionized colleagues, and by extension to 
that of non-union employees, we aim to shed more light on the mechanisms through which pro-
social behaviors could spill over from members to other individuals with whom members 
interact and on the conditions that make the spillover more likely.  
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Two conditions can be identified to account for social influence across membership 
boundaries: first, the existence of opportunities for members of a focal group to influence non-
members; and, second, the willingness of non-members to accept certain behaviors as desirable 
and in line with their identity. To the extent that members and free-riders do work alongside each 
other, it is clear that the opportunity for influence exists. Although not involved in activities and 
discussion networks related to union affairs, free-riders interact with union members in their 
capacity as co-workers in a unionized organization. Therefore, compared to employees in non-
unionized work environments, free-riders are more likely to witness public displays of civic 
behavior such as collective donations and to get exposure to a wider range of charitable causes. 
Thus, one would expect free-riders to not necessarily be as charitable as union members, but at 
least more likely to contribute to charitable causes than the non-unionized.  
Conversely, one could predict just the opposite when reasoning about the second 
condition, i.e. the willingness of free-riders to accept and emulate the pro-social behavior of 
union members. As already discussed, individuals’ decisions to contribute to charities is 
influenced by the behavior of those with whom they identify. To the extent that free-riders do not 
identify with their unionized colleagues, they will be less inclined to follow the latter’s behavior 
(Haile, Bryson and White 2015) and therefore contribute less to charities. At the limit, lack of 
identification can turn into outright dis-identification (Brewer and Kramer 1985; Elsbach and 
Bhattacharya 2001). This is even more likely to happen, for instance, when unions organize 
charitable collections at work, because it makes union members’ behavior more salient to free-
riders. As labor unions aim to better integrate with the community, partnerships between unions 
and community organizations have become more intense, and raising money for charities at work 
has become more common. As a result, dis-identification could make free-riders not only less 
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likely to contribute compared to their unionized colleagues, but the least likely group to give, 
even compared to those who are in non-unionized environments. We investigate both conjectures 
by comparing the incidence and level of giving of members and free-riders in unionized 
workplaces with the charitable behavior of non-unionized workers. 
Individual Differences and Charitable Giving 
For both union members and free-riders, one cannot rule out the possibility that their 
giving behavior is not only different from that of non-union members and from each other’s 
because they are exposed to different social influences, but also because they are different kinds 
of people. For instance, it is possible that free-riders and union members possess relatively stable 
individual characteristics that correlate in distinct ways with both the propensity to join voluntary 
associations and the likelihood of charitable giving. Indeed, evidence exists that individual 
differences, such as empathy and agreeableness, affect both individuals’ preferences for 
association and their pro-social behaviors such as volunteering and giving (Bekkers 2005, 2006; 
Carlo, Okun, Knight and de Guzman 2005; Graziano, Habashi, Sheese and Tobin 2007; Stocks, 
Lishner and Decker 2009; Volk, Thöni, and Ruigrok 2011). In a union context, the literature 
provides evidence that current union members are more agreeable than former union members 
(Dinesen, Norgaard and Klemmenses 2013). Interestingly, these relationships likely provide 
some insight to Condie, Warner and Gillman’s (1976) finding that individuals who possess more 
of a free-rider disposition are less likely to donate to the collective good (e.g., blood donation). 
Overall, these studies suggest that certain individual differences might indeed be correlated with 
a more or less “prosocial personality that is consistently related to a broad range of prosocial 
behaviors” (Penner et al. 2005: 375).  
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We investigate the possible contribution of individual characteristics by using both 
between-category effects and within-person effects in our analyses. While between effects 
describe differences in charitable behavior ignoring the effect of time-invariant individual 
characteristics potentially correlated with membership status and with charitable giving (e.g. 
empathy, agreeableness), within-person effects account for the effect of such characteristics. 
Moreover, by comparing between- and within- effects we can draw stronger conclusions 
regarding potential spillover effects.  
Data 
To investigate the relationship between union membership and giving we use data from 
the Philanthropy Panel Study (PPS), the philanthropy module within the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a socio-economic panel study of American households, running 
since 1968. It was annual until 1997, when it became biennial. Response rates are high (typically 
96-98 per cent in the years we examine) and attrition rates are low, due to efforts to make contact 
with “lost” families and their members. We use data for 2001-2011 when the PPS module was 
introduced (Wilhelm et al. 2001) which gives us six waves of longitudinal information on 
charitable giving. In each wave, the survey respondents were asked questions regarding their 
family’s donations for a variety of charitable purposes (e.g. youth and family services, 
neighborhoods and communities, helping the needy, educational, health, combined purpose). No 
other data source provides such a rich set of longitudinal information on charitable giving 
coupled with detailed socio-economic characteristics (discussed below). Moreover, the PPS data 
has been shown to provide an accurate and robust picture of giving with minimal missing data 
and good representativeness relative to comparable data sources (Wilhelm 2007). Finally, 
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respondents answered questions regarding whether their job contract was negotiated by a union 
and whether they were members of that union. 
 Our sample starts with all employed heads of households in the PPS data, from 2001-
2011. This strategy allows us to track an individual over time even when s/he changes the 
household (for use of individual level data from PPS see also Wilhelm et al. 2008). For instance, 
heads can change households as they separate from previous partners and move alone into a new 
household or move in with a new spouse. Our analyses control for changes in the household 
conditions of the head such as family income or number of children in the household, which 
could influence giving behavior. Ideally, we would like to have information on the donations 
initiated only by the household head instead of whole household donations. For single-adult 
households (about 36 percent of our sample), the declared donation represents the single-adult 
respondent behavior. For couples, the assumption that household donation is indicative of the 
head’s charitable behavior needs further evidence. Fortunately, in two waves (2003 and 2005 
respectively) PPS includes questions regarding “who decides.” Respondents indicate whether 
they decide alone or whether others contribute to the decision. We analyzed the pattern on 
responses and found that, in each of the two years, the percent of household heads who declare 
that they are involved in the decision regarding charitable giving is approximately 82 percent. 
This is consistent with findings from a related literature that spouses influence each other’s pro-
social behavior (Rotolo and Wilson 2006). Moreover, for individuals who do not change 
households from 2003 to 2005, the decision making pattern barely changes (91 percent of heads 
of household in our sample have the same decision pattern in 2003 and 2005). Our analyses are 
therefore conducted under the assumption that household heads who are not living in single-adult 
households do participate in the decision to donate. In additional analyses, we removed the 
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individuals who in 2003 and 2005 did not answer the “who decides” question or who responded 
that someone else in their household was the primary decision maker on charitable donations, 
and the obtained results were consistent with the ones reported here. 
 We start with a sample of 6,194 employed heads residing alone or in a couple who 
responded to the PPS and also responded to the 1999 wave of the PSID (we include 1999 since 
we lag our control variables and want to have the same two-year time interval as in the PPS 
survey). We remove any observations with missing data, leaving 6,079 heads with 18,074 yearly 
observations. We then further remove those heads who do not appear in at least two consecutive 
waves. This leaves us with a final sample of 5,217 heads and 14,889 year-observations 
(unweighted). Table 1 shows the number of spells per respondent. 
-- Insert Table 1 Here -- 
Dependent variables: To account for the incidence of giving we use the indicator variable that 
corresponds to the screening question which asked respondents whether they gave more than $25 
of donations in the previous year. To account for amount donated, we use the logarithm of total 
given to charity as our main dependent variable, constructed from aggregating giving across all 
types of charitable contribution types. As we use self-reported giving data, we are aware that 
both the incidence of giving and the amount given might be subject to bias, either due to social 
desirability or due to modesty (Bekkers and Wiekping 2011). At the same time, existing studies 
do not find that members of civic associations and unions are more affected by either of these 
biases (Abraham, Helms and Presser 2009; Delaney, Masters and Schwochau 1988). Thus, our 
analyses are conducted under the assumption that self-reported charitable behavior does not 
systematically vary across union membership categories.     
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Independent variables: To account for union membership and free-riding, we classify person-
observations into three groups: (1) non-union employee (the reference category), (2) union 
member, and (3) free-rider (i.e. working in a job covered by a union contract but not a member 
of the union). To define the free-riders we use two questions from the PSID. The questions ask 
first, whether the respondent’s job is covered by a union contract and second, whether the 
respondent belongs to that union. Because the coverage question refers to the respondent’s job, 
as opposed to a respondent’s workplace, it filters out employees who work in a unionized 
organization but who, for various reasons, are excluded from the bargaining unit (Budd 2012).  
Control variables: To account for other factors documented to affect different forms of civic 
behavior, including charitable giving, we use the following five sets of controls: (1) Demo-
graphic controls: gender, age, race, a poor health indicator, whether urban resident, whether 
reside in right-to-work state, and education; (2) Job and workplace controls: We control for 
tenure in the current job, whether working part-time and whether in a non-
managerial/professional occupation. We also control for whether the respondent moved to a new 
employer because changing union status could coincide with moving to a new job. We also 
include a dummy variable indicating whether the individual works in the public sector; (3) 
Household controls: We control for family status (whether a cohabiting spouse is present, 
married or not), for number of children, and for the family income; (4) Social capital indicators: 
We control for an array of factors that are likely to influence social capital and giving and may 
also vary among unionized, free-riders, and non-unionized workers. We control for personal 
experience with altruistic behavior, such as whether the respondent received informal financial 
support from others (dummy variable) and whether the respondent gave informal support 
(dummy variable). Additionally, we account for religious affiliation which has shown to be a 
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very strong predictor of secular as well as religious giving (Wilhelm et al. 2008). Appendix 1 
provides a detailed definition of all variables. 
 Ideally we would have also controlled for previous union membership and previous free-
riding to account for potential longer term effects of either of these experiences on charitable 
giving. Recent research has shown that previous union experiences do affect individuals’ 
propensity to become union members (Booth, Budd and Munday 2010; Bryson and Gomez 
2005) as well as their level of civic engagement, especially their voting behavior (Bryson et al. 
2014). Unfortunately, unlike Booth et al. (2010) who could reconstruct the entire employment 
history of their respondents and Bryson et al. (2014) who could rely on a self-reported measure 
of previous union membership, our data does not allow us to track individuals’ full past 
engagement with unions or their free-riding. We discuss the impact of this data limitation in the 
concluding section.    
Analytic Strategy 
To explore the relationship between union membership and charitable behavior we first 
examine differences in likelihood of giving and amount given by members and free-riders, 
compared to non-union employees. Since we are interested in both between-person and within-
person effects, we separate out between- and within-person effects using a within-between 
random effects specification. This estimation technique, a reformulation of that proposed by 
Mundlack (1978), has received increasing attention among social scientists working with panel 
data as the most appropriate way of estimating both within- and between-observation unit effects 
in the same equation (Bartels 2008; Bell and Jones 2012). Compared to more prevalent modeling 
techniques based on pooled data (which combine the within- and between- conditions effects 
into a single coefficient) or fixed effects (which perform poorly in situations in which changes in 
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condition is slow or infrequent, as is the case with union membership), the technique employed 
here is more suited to our purposes, because it allows us to estimate the general giving gap 
between union members, free-riders, and the non-unionized (between-person effect) as well as 
the effect of joining a union or becoming a free-rider (within-person effect). In addition, it allows 
us to reliably implement tobit models when it comes to the estimation of amounts given, a left-
censored variable. 
The basic equation is given by: 
  (1) 
where: 
  (2) 
which combines to give: 
  (3) 
In our case,  is a giving measure. Subscripts i denote level-1 units, which are measurement 
occasions (waves), whilst subscripts j denote the level-2 units (individuals).  are the random 
intercepts,  are the level-1 coefficients which are time-varying, and  are the level-2 
coefficients which are time-invariant. The random parts are  (level-1) and  (level-2). In this 
conventional formulation, the level-1 are conflated into a single coefficient, , which is a 
weighted effect of both.2 
By transforming our independent variables, the model can be reformulated to separate out 
the within- from the between-person effects into separate coefficients. The between-person 
effect, are the person-specific means of each of the union status variables across all waves. The 
                                                 
2 In the fixed effect approach the between-effects are absorbed into the person dummies, leaving only within-
respondent effects. 
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within-person effect of changing union status on giving (e.g. becoming a union member) is 
captured by the deviation in a specific wave from the person-specific usual union membership, 
free-rider, or non-union status, i.e. an individual’s union membership, free-rider, or non-union 
status in any given wave centered on their person-specific average for each of these variable, 
, which is time-variant. Because the within-person effects are mean-centered, they are 
uncorrelated with the between-person random effects, removing the commonly-held limitation of 
the random effects approach. We fit logit models for our binary dependent variables and tobit 
models for the giving amounts in the form of: 
  (4) 
We perform this transformation on all of our time-varying covariates.  
Results 
Table 2 shows the distribution of union members, free-riders, and non-union employees 
along a number of socio-demographic dimensions. In line with previous studies, compared to 
non-union employees, union members in our sample are likely to be slightly older, male, and of 
African-American race. In terms of workplace and job controls, union members are slightly more 
likely to come from non-managerial and professional occupations, less likely to be part-timers 
and have longer job tenure. Regarding the free-riders compared to both union and non-union 
employees, they are more likely to work in public sector. Also, free-riders are more likely than 
union members to work in right-to-work states.  
-- Insert Table 2 Here -- 
-- Insert Table 3 Here -- 
Table 3 includes correlation coefficients between the variables included in our analyses. 
Table 4 presents the analyses for the likelihood of giving with the within- and between-effects 
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specifications. All coefficients reported have been converted to average partial effects to 
facilitate interpretation. This means that the coefficients for whether donate to charity are 
interpreted as the effect of a unit change in the independent variable on the probability of 
donating while those for amount donated are interpreted as the percentage change in charitable 
giving. The first two columns (Base model) present the average partial effects for probability of 
giving. We first focus on the between-effects, i.e. the general differences in giving between 
groups. The between-effects (column 2) are generally in line with existing evidence that 
education has a significant positive impact on giving, along with religiosity, family status and 
family income. In column 4, the effect of union membership on giving is positive and significant, 
while the effect of free-riding is negative and significant. These results are in line with the 
hypothesis that union members are more likely to donate to charitable causes, while free-riders 
represent the least charitable category of employees. Specifically, compared to non-members, 
union members are about 3 percent more likely to give, while free-riders are about 12 percent 
less likely.  
We also examine the within-effects, i.e. the effect of switching from union membership 
status category to another, controlling for time-invariant fixed effects (Table 4 column 3). Once 
we control for changes in job attributes and other observable characteristics, we find that joining 
a union is accompanied by a boost in charitable giving, while becoming a free-rider is 
accompanied by a drop in giving. The magnitude of the effect is smaller for within-person effects 
than for the between-person effect, but still significant. Joining a union makes an individual 
almost 3 percent more likely to give to a charity, while a move to free-riding makes an individual 
almost 4 percent less likely to give. Thus it appears that joining a union does increase the 
probability of giving to charity, while selecting into free-riding makes one less likely to give.  
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-- Insert Table 4 Here -- 
We further divide the sample into right-to-work state (Table 4 columns 5 and 6) and non-
right-to-work state (Table 4 columns 7 and 8). As outlined already, the reasoning here is that 
there might be differences in the way free-riders behave in right-to work and non-right-to-work 
states (Budd 2012). Consistent with our previous results, between-effects in both right-to-work 
and non-right-to-work show that union members are significantly more giving in both 
classifications. The disaggregated results for free-riders are also consistent with the aggregate 
finding; that is, free-riders are less likely to give in both state types. Concerning within-effects, 
which show the impact of a change in status on giving, becoming a union member increases the 
propensity to give in both right-to-work and non-right-to-work states, while becoming a free-
rider has a significant and negative effect on charitable giving in both states. Becoming a union 
member makes one almost 2 percent more likely to give to charity in a right-to-work state and 
about 3 percent more likely to give in a non-right-to-work state. In turn, becoming a free-rider 
makes one about 8 percent less likely to give to charity in right-to-work states and about 1.5 
percent less likely in non-right-to-work states. The difference is however not statistically 
significant (Wald tests for whether gave union member prob> χ2 = 0.457; free-rider prob> χ2 = 
0.264). 
  With respect to amount given both between- and within- effects are significant for 
members and free-riders (Table 5, columns 3 and 4). Union members generally give more, and 
also becoming a member (within-effects) makes one more generous. Instead, free-riders not only 
give less than other employees, but also one’s transition into free-riding reduces their generosity. 
Because the coefficients represent percentage change in charitable giving, we translate the main 
results in dollars. However, because the survey only registers the amount given for those who 
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gave more than $25 the between effects might be over-estimated, while the within-individual 
effects might be under-estimated. Thus, for within-person effects, becoming a union member 
increases the average amount donated to charity by about $28, while becoming a free-rider 
decreases the average amount donated by $65. For the between-category effects, the general 
cross-sectional difference between being a union member and non-union is $98, while the effect 
of being a free-rider is about $222 less giving annually – controlling for other factors. We 
conducted the same analysis on split samples in right-to-work (Table 5 columns 5 and 6) and 
non-right-to-work states (Table 5 columns 7 and 8). The effects are statistically significant in 
both settings and for both members and free-riders and comparable with the results in the full 
model. Although the coefficients appear different, differences between the two kinds of state are 
statistically indistinguishable (Wald tests for amount given union member prob> χ2 = 0.416; 
free-rider prob> χ2 = 0.077). Taken together, the results of the analyses for the likelihood of 
giving and amount given show the same pattern: compared to non-unionized employees, trade 
union members are more likely to give and also to give more, while free-riders are the category 
least likely to contribute to charities. 
-- Insert Table 5 Here -- 
Additional Analyses 
We believe that further investigating the effects of giving over time could shed more light 
on the link between the social capital created by unions and giving behavior. In particular we are 
interested in two aspects. First, we are interested in whether the effects that we unveiled 
represent a one-time change or if they last. If it is indeed the case that unions do have a positive 
impact on the giving behaviors we would expect that effect to last beyond the first year in which 
a non-member joins a union. Alternatively, if leaving a union has a negative impact on giving, 
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we expect that free-riders will continue to be less charitable beyond the first year in which they 
transition into free-riding. Second, we aim to understand whether the way in which the shift into 
union membership and free-riding happened, i.e. either by taking a new membership status in the 
same organization or by taking a new job in a new organization, affects giving. Below we 
present a series of models that aim to address the two aspects.  
Persistence of membership and free-riding effects 
To investigate this line of reasoning, we extend our examination of within-person effects 
in a series of models presented in Figure 1. Here, we examine leads and lags in giving before and 
after the transition to a new membership state to see if the union and free-riding within-effects 
established in Tables 4 and 5 dissipate or remain even if a worker switches out of union 
membership or becomes a free-rider.3 We examine transitions from three base states: (1) non-
union into free-riding or union-member (Panel A); (2) union member to free-rider or non-union 
(Panel B); and (3) free-rider to union or non-union (Panel C). For each transition, we create a 
series of dummies which indicate when the transition was made (T=0), one wave after the 
transition (T=1), and the second wave after the transition (T=2). The dummies are created such 
that if a worker became a union member in one wave, but then left in the next wave, his/her T=0 
is coded 1, but his/her T=1 is coded 0. If a worker joined a union at T=0, and remained a member 
for T=1, then s/he is coded 1 for both. If a worker remained a union member for another wave or 
more after this, then T=2 is coded 1. Leads were calculated in a similar way but with lead 
dummies in a separate equation. We use the same set of controls as in previous models.  
-- Insert Table 6 Here -- 
-- Insert Figure 1 Here -- 
                                                 
3 These analyses are conducted on smaller samples as we retain only individuals with more than three consecutive 
years in the panel. As a result the magnitude of the effects in the panels is different than the effects in the tables, yet 
in the same direction. Table 6 describes transition states.  
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Figure 1, Panel A shows that before the transition those who did not work in a unionized 
firm and were to become free-riders and union members respectively were almost 
indistinguishable in terms of likelihood of donating to charity. As they change status, the latter 
becomes slightly more likely to give; this is consistent with what we found in the previous 
analysis. We find no evidence that this effect disappears at T=2. For non-unionized workers who 
become free-riders, we find a negative effect in giving, which grows over time. Panel A also 
shows similar effects for the amount of giving. These results indicate that both the positive effect 
of becoming a member and the negative effect of becoming a free-rider last beyond the initial 
transition. 
Panel B shows the giving trajectory of former union members. We find no significant 
overall change in propensity to give for those who switch to non-unionized status; yet, for those 
who become free-riders, their propensity to give generally declines and the negative effect even 
grows slightly in magnitude over time. Similarly, once individuals separate themselves from 
union membership status and its potential source of social capital, the amount of giving appears 
to regress over time for both types of switchers. This result suggests that without the constant 
hypothesized social capital supports, the union effect on giving diminishes.  
Panel C shows the giving trajectory of free-riders who switch to union membership or 
non-unionized employment. We find that the likelihood of giving increases for free-riders who 
join a union. Moreover, the effect remains through T=2. Concerning the amount given, former 
free-riders who become new union members give more compared to what they gave previously; 
this effect also stays in place through T=2. These trends suggest that when free-riders are freed 
of the negative social capital effect their giving is likely to increase. 
25 
 
 
The impact of membership change and job change 
A second conjecture worth investigating is whether there are differences in giving 
behavior between those who become free-riders as a result of switching to a new job and those 
who leave the union while remaining in the same organization. This is important because 
differences between the two types of free-riders can shed light on mechanisms through which 
unions affect civic behavior. We repeat the analyses reported in Tables 4 and 5 including an 
interaction term between free-riders and new jobs (full analyses not reported here). While all the 
results previously reported remain in place, we also found that becoming a free-rider while 
remaining in the same organization makes an individual significantly less likely to give. Instead, 
becoming a free-rider upon changing organizations, that is becoming a free-rider by not joining 
the union upon entering a unionized workplace, attenuates the negative effect of free-riding on 
giving. Similarly, becoming a union member upon joining a new unionized workplace has a 
positive impact on giving. Moreover, new union members who do not change jobs appear to 
become more charitable. The results for amount given display a similar pattern. 
 These results suggest that the presence of a union at the workplace has an initial positive 
impact on new-comers. However, for individuals who become free-riders, this initial advantage 
disappears. Regarding the mechanisms discussed in the theory section, the results suggest that 
unions do sensitize employees to charitable causes. However, once an individual opts out of the 
union, the individual seems to not only reject union causes, but also charitable causes.  
Conclusion 
This study examines how labor union membership and free-riding affect charitable 
giving. Using panel data, we first looked at the incidence and amount given to charity by 
members and free-riders, compared to non-members. Second, we examine the persistence of 
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charitable behavior for members and free-riders, as well as the possible spillover effects that 
unions might generate within an organization.  
The results of our analyses show that: (1) union members are more likely to make 
charitable donations and that they give more than other employees; (2) free-riding status has 
generally a negative effect on one’s charitable behavior; (3) joining a union positively affects 
charitable behavior, while moving into a free-riding position makes one less likely to contribute. 
Moreover, our study shows evidence that (4) the positive effects of union membership appear to 
last for at least a couple of years, providing that the individual does not move into a free-riding 
position. Finally, some of our supplementary analyses suggest a positive relationship between 
joining a unionized work place and giving, but also that those who separate from the union (free-
riders) disengage from charitable behavior as well. This last finding is important because it sheds 
some light on the mechanisms through which labor unions affect the civic behavior of members, 
as well as, the civic behavior of those with whom members interact at work.  
 While previous research has predicated a positive relationship between labor union 
membership and charitable behavior, existing evidence is still limited and comes primarily from 
case studies, aggregate level and cross-sectional data (e.g. Zullo 2011). Moreover, recent 
research suggests that union membership is likely to affect political participation but not 
necessarily charitable engagement (Kerrissey and Schofer 2013). Using a rich panel dataset, we 
were able to address causality more efficiently and, thus, to provide new solid evidence that 
union membership generates civic engagement in the form of charitable behavior. Indeed, 
because within-person effects for union membership are positive and significant, one can 
conclude that union status has a positive impact on giving, net of time invariant individual 
characteristics. At the same time, the positive significant between membership category effects 
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suggest that individual characteristics might also be important for explaining the charitable 
giving of members, especially with respect to the amount given.  
 In addition to showing that union membership increases charitable giving, our study also 
sheds some light on the behavior of free-riders. While existing research on the role of labor 
unions in civil society has focused on the civic and political engagement of union members, the 
civic behavior of free-riders has generally been ignored. Our analyses suggests that free-riders’ 
behavior is different than that of members and non-members, thus highlighting the fact that a 
workplace union could affect members and free-riders in distinct ways. Indeed, further research 
should explore more carefully both the civic and political participation of free-riders in order to 
understand the impact of workplace unions on employees’ wider citizenship engagement.    
Why are free-riders different from union members? And why are they less likely to 
engage in charitable giving? One explanation may be those who refuse to join a union are viewed 
extremely negatively by unionized colleagues who therefore are likely to shy away from 
interacting with the free-riders. This would reduce free-riders’ access to information regarding 
charitable causes and, thus, have a negative effect on their charitable giving. In addition, as free-
riders become more isolated, they are more likely to encounter dis-identification (Brewer and 
Kramer 1985; Elsbach and Bhattacharya 2001). This will make them less likely to engage in 
activities promoted by union members and less likely to emulate the latter’s behavior, thus 
affecting their charitable giving in a negative way. A second explanation is that free-riders are a 
different type of people and that their strong opposition to unions is indicative of some specific 
underlying characteristics that are also negatively correlated with the propensity to engage in 
charitable giving.  
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The type of analysis conducted in this study and the additional analyses suggest that the 
social element plays an important role, yet exactly as in the case of union members, they also 
suggest that individual characteristics are also important for understanding the charitable 
behavior of free-riders, especially with respect to the amount given for charity. Regarding the 
social aspect, the within-person negative and significant effect for free-riding suggests that the 
social influence available to union members does not affect free-riders who work alongside 
union members and that, in fact, being aware of union members’ charitable activities might 
reduce free-riders propensity to give (conform to the “dis-identification” argument). Figure 1 
Panel C concurs to this conjecture. Specifically, Figure 1 Panel C shows that free-riders who 
change their status to union members are more likely to give and to give more. Moreover, the 
models with interaction effects between membership status and new jobs also show that free-
riders who join a unionized workplace are more giving than free-riders who are already in the 
organization and opt-out of their union. This result suggests that joining a unionized place might 
have an initial positive impact on new employees, possibly because it creates awareness to the 
possibility of engaging in charitable giving. It also shows that when members opt out of unions 
and become free-riders they also reject the charitable engagement associated with unions. While 
our within-person estimates establish that the social influence aspect matters above and beyond 
individual characteristics, our analyses cannot rule out that personality characteristics might also 
play an important role in free-riders’ lower propensity to engage in charitable giving. Indeed, the 
statistically significant and relatively large between-effects suggest that explanatory power 
remains and could be explained by specific individual characteristics. 
Further investigation is required to understand how giving behaviors can simultaneously 
be different for union members and free-riders. We acknowledge that only a small percent of our 
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sample is represented by free-riders. Given this small proportion, conducting additional analyses 
that would further split our sample into smaller subgroups was not feasible. We note that the 
supplemental analyses we were able to conduct provided consistent findings, yet this empirical 
effort has suggested that a more qualitative investigation is required in order to understand the 
mechanisms that discourage free-riders’ engagement with charitable giving. If it turns out that 
free-riders are a different type of people, who oppose unionism and the values that it promotes, 
there is perhaps little that unions or union member colleagues can do to influence these 
individuals. If, on the other hand, their behavior is primarily the outcome of social isolation, then 
some influencing is possible.  
A final limitation of our study, already mentioned in the data section, relates to the lack 
of information about previous membership status. Specifically, this means that our current 
reference ‘non-union’ category includes a combination of never-members (i.e., current non-
union employees who have never worked in a union environment) and ex-members (i.e., current 
non-union employees who were union members in the past). Similarly, our current free-rider 
category could also include never-members (i.e., free-riders who have never become union 
members) and ex-members. To the extent that ex-members and never-members display similar 
current behaviors, this limitation should not raise concerns. However, some recent evidence 
suggests that current behaviors, such as voting, are affected not only by current membership 
status but also by previous union experiences. For instance, Bryson et al. (2014) show that 
employees who are ex-union members are slightly more likely to vote than never-members and 
are also more likely to participate in demonstrations or sign petitions. Bryson et al. (2014) 
suggest that participation in union activities currently or in the past teaches individuals to voice 
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their concerns which, in turn, results in long term reduction in the cost of their civic engagement 
as well as in an increase in the efficacy of civic behavior (union “voice effect”).  
Could we expect ex-membership to affect charitable behavior to the same extent that it 
affects voting? On one hand, it is not immediately obvious that the union voice effect would 
have a significant impact on the charitable giving of ex-members. Moreover, most of the 
mechanisms that we suggest as enhancing charitable behavior (current social networks that 
facilitate information sharing, create social influence and membership identification) are meant 
to have primarily contemporaneous effects. On the other hand, we do posit that unions, similar to 
other voluntary organizations, do sensitize individuals to social issues in the wider community. 
Although it is possible that this effect lasts longer than the membership, our supplementary 
analysis does not fully support this assumption, as those who leave the union appear to display 
less charitable behavior (Figure 1 Panel B). Further research is needed to disentangle the 
combined effects of current and previous union status on charitable giving. Lastly, we note that 
further research could apply a framework similar to the one developed here to examine how 
labor union membership and free-riding affect other civic behaviors, such as volunteering, thus 
gathering more evidence on how labor unions create publicly valuable outcomes within and 
beyond the workplace (Budd 2014). 
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Table 1. Number of consecutive spells per respondent 
Consecutive spells Observation count 
2 1,775 
3 2,473 
4 2,354 
5 2,093 
6 1,971 
7 4,223 
Total N 14,889 
Note: Data are not weighted. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
 Overall Non-union Free-rider Union member Min Max 
Categorical 
Variables 
      
Non-union 0.82    0 1 
Free-rider 0.02    0 1 
Union member 0.16    0 1 
Whether donate to 
charity 
0.69 0.68 0.64 0.75 0 1 
Female 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.22 0 1 
African-American 0.12 0.11 0.24 0.17 0 1 
Hispanic 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0 1 
Urban 0.67 0.66 0.70 0.72 0 1 
Part-time 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.10 0 1 
Non-man./prof. 
occupation 
0.63 0.61 0.61 0.67 0 1 
New job 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.08 0 1 
Public sector 0.21 0.15 0.60 0.46   0   1 
Right-to-work 
state 
0.37 0.41 0.35 0.18   0   1 
Poor health 0.09 0.091 0.07 0.09 0 1 
Gave informal 
support 
0.10 0.10 0.09 0.12 0 1 
Received informal 
support 
0.10 0.10 0.11 0.07 0 1 
Religious 0.86 0.86 0.90 0.88 0 1 
Cohabiting spouse 0.60 0.60 0.51 0.63 0 1 
       
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Min Max 
Continuous 
Variables 
          
(log)Amount 
donated to charity 
4.65 3.35 4.57 3.34 3.76 3.23 5.16 3.36 0 11.24 
Age 44.31 12.38 44.06 12.65 43.75 12.84 45.66 10.73 17 85 
Years of 
education 
13.62 2.45 13.67 2.49 13.44 2.60 13.40 2.21 0 17 
Tenure 8.95 9.02 7.96 8.33 10.27 10.36 13.89 10.47 0 50 
Number of 
children 
0.73 1.08 0.73 1.09 0.62 0.96 0.75 1.08 0 11 
(log) Family 
income 
10.92 0.79 10.89 0.82 10.85 0.71 11.07 0.60 0 14.43 
Note: Data are weighted.
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Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
 1. Non-union 1              
 2. Free-rider -0.328 1             
 3. Union member -0.920 -0.07 1            
 4. Whether donate to charity -0.045 -0.025 0.058 1           
5. (log) Amount donated -0.061 -0.050 0.086 0.913 1          
6. Female 0.018 0.039 -0.035 -0.109 -0.141 1         
7. Age -0.084 -0.010 0.093 0.226 0.271 0.009 1        
8. African-American -0.089 0.071 0.064 -0.149 -0.154 0.296 -0.048 1       
9. Hispanic 0.010 -0.004 -0.009 -0.079 -0.094 -0.035 -0.040 -0.088 1      
10. Poor health -0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.094 -0.113 0.096 0.124 0.102 0.060 1     
11. Urban -0.060 0.013 0.058 0.037 0.047 0.089 0.011 0.171 0.076 -0.007 1    
12. Education (years) 0.034 -0.016 -0.029 0.282 0.345 -0.035 0.050 -0.152 -0.220 -0.200 0.106 1   
13. Part-time 0.017 0.014 -0.024 -0.105 -0.118 0.222 0.035 0.078 -0.011 0.135 0.006 -0.057 1  
14. Tenure -0.238 0.017 0.244 0.202 0.247 -0.080 0.491 -0.013 -0.051 0.032 0.004 0.038 -0.164 1 
15. Non-manag./prof. occ. -0.014 0.003 0.109 -0.251 -0.313 0.006 -0.080 0.183 0.093 0.117 -0.103 -0.546 0.086 -0.044 
16. New job 0.014 0.015 -0.150 -0.193 -0.214 0.042 -0.234 0.061 0.045 0.034 -0.032 -0.154 0.264 -0.517 
17. Public sector -0.277 0.121 0.242 0.076 0.091 0.066 0.075 0.088 -0.055 -0.035 0.008 0.173 -0.030 0.183 
18. Right-to-work state 0.157 0.015 -0.172 -0.029 -0.013 0.059 -0.041 0.218 -0.054 0.007 -0.176 -0.051 -0.027 -0.065 
19. Gave informal support -0.016 -0.010 0.021 0.115 0.148 -0.006 0.107 0.018 0.086 0.040 0.059 0.063 -0.030 0.065 
20. Received informal support 0.052 0.011 -0.059 -0.110 -0.138 0.203 -0.298 0.098 -0.037 0.053 0.029 -0.001 0.204 -0.250 
21. Religious -0.014 0.009 0.010 0.114 0.139 0.039 0.150 0.075 0.045 -0.006 0.022 0.007 -0.021 0.094 
22. Cohabiting -0.017 -0.035 0.032 0.193 0.245 -0.749 0.075 -0.299 0.053 -0.101 -0.086 0.036 -0.241 0.143 
23. Number of children 0.018 0.002 -0.019 -0.050 -0.044 -0.018 -0.255 0.096 0.103 -0.028 0.015 -0.133 -0.044 -0.127 
24. (log) Family income -0.076 -0.035 0.095 0.382 0.477 -0.419 0.243 -0.322 -0.061 -0.183 0.110 0.409 -0.369 0.298 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix, continued. 
 
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
15. Non-manag./prof. occ. 1         
16. New job 0.130 1        
17. Public sector -0.139 -0.181 1       
18. Right-to-work state 0.069 0.071 0.012 1      
19. Gave informal support -0.104 -0.050 0.026 -0.029 1     
20. Received informal support 0.021 0.192 -0.027 0.009 -0.022 1    
21. Religious -0.025 -0.060 0.025 0.085 0.019 -0.063 1   
22. Cohabiting -0.048 -0.090 -0.050 -0.049 0.018 -0.231 0.013 1  
23. Number of children 0.074 0.071 -0.032 0.017 -0.073 0.046 0.019 0.194 1 
24. (log) Family income -0.376 -0.294 0.068 -0.153 0.149 -0.289 0.062 0.544 -0.011 
          
Notes: Data are weighted 
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Table 4. Relationship between union status and whether donated to charity 
 Base Model Full Model Right-to-work states Non-right-to-work states 
 Within Between Within Between Within Between Within Between 
Union member   0.027*** 0.031*** 0.019* 0.091*** 0.032*** 0.017*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) 
Free-rider   -0.039*** -0.126*** -0.084*** -0.052** -0.015* -0.181*** 
   (0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.007) (0.013) 
Female   0.088***  0.088***  0.088***  0.082*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.004) 
Age -0.020*** 0.005*** -0.021*** 0.005*** -0.005 0.004*** -0.035*** 0.005*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
African-
American 
 -0.074***  -0.073***  -0.062***  -0.085*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Hispanic  -0.067***  -0.065***  -0.080***  -0.050*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.005) 
Poor health 0.013*** -0.022*** 0.012*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.015+ 0.033*** -0.029*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) 
Urban 0.001 0.029*** 0.001 0.028*** -0.002 0.031*** 0.000 0.024*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) 
Right-to-work 
state 
-0.041*** 0.023*** -0.039*** 0.026***     
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)     
Education 0.012*** 0.027*** 0.012*** 0.027*** 0.004 0.032*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Part-time 0.005 0.063*** 0.005+ 0.061*** 0.019*** 0.061*** -0.002 0.070*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) 
Tenure 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
New job 0.006** -0.018*** 0.007** -0.018*** 0.016*** -0.025** 0.005+ -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) 
Public sector -0.005 -0.014*** -0.005 -0.015*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.006 -0.010* 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Non-man./prof. 
occ. 
-0.010*** -0.092*** -0.010*** -0.097*** -0.017*** -0.121*** -0.009** -0.091*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Gave informal 
support 
-0.016*** 0.114*** -0.016*** 0.112*** -0.025*** 0.123*** -0.011** 0.118*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007) 
Received 
informal support 
-0.034*** 0.033*** -0.034*** 0.033*** -0.040*** 0.156*** -0.026*** -0.043*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.006) 
Religious 0.361*** 0.070*** 0.361*** 0.070*** 0.547*** 0.104*** 0.272*** 0.063*** 
 (0.022) (0.003) (0.022) (0.003) (0.047) (0.006) (0.026) (0.003) 
Cohabitating 
spouse 
0.030*** 0.081*** 0.030*** 0.084*** 0.044*** 0.089*** 0.016*** 0.075*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Number of 
children 
-0.001 0.009*** -0.001 0.009*** 0.006* 0.004* -0.004** 0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
(log) Family 
income 
0.029*** 0.184*** 0.029*** 0.181*** 0.018*** 0.169*** 0.038*** 0.182*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
-2LL 279,965 279,608 108,034 169,964 
Individuals 5,217 5,217 2,300 2,885 
Observations 14,889 14,889 6,364 8,286 
Notes: Average partial effects reported. Intercepts and year effects omitted to save space. Between-effects refer to time-
invariant gaps in giving between free-riders, union members, and non-union workers. Within-effects refer to the time-
varying effects of change in union status on the outcome variable. For a detailed explanation, see text. Data are weighted. 
Statistical significance: +p < 0.10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (standard errors are in parentheses).
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Table 5. Relationship between union status and total amount of (log) charitable giving 
 Base Model Full Model Right-to-work states Non-right-to-work states 
 Within Between Within Between Within Between Within Between 
Union member   0.165*** 0.381*** 0.249*** 0.920*** 0.115*** 0.252*** 
   (0.022) (0.022) (0.045) (0.047) (0.025) (0.026) 
Free-rider   -0.238*** -0.801*** -0.356*** -0.974*** -0.137*** -0.682*** 
   (0.032) (0.070) (0.061) (0.112) (0.037) (0.090) 
Female   0.630***  0.638***  0.711***  0.534*** 
  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.040)  (0.028) 
Age -0.078*** 0.034*** -0.085*** 0.035*** 0.014 0.030*** -0.194*** 0.038*** 
 (0.023) (0.001) (0.023) (0.001) (0.034) (0.001) (0.030) (0.001) 
African-
American 
 -0.353***  -0.363***  -0.285***  -0.393*** 
  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.033)  (0.030) 
Hispanic  -0.604***  -0.599***  -0.810***  -0.394*** 
  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.050)  (0.036) 
Poor health 0.044* -0.178*** 0.041* -0.183*** -0.201*** -0.190*** 0.129*** -0.190*** 
 (0.019) (0.032) (0.019) (0.032) (0.033) (0.053) (0.022) (0.039) 
Urban 0.130*** 0.124*** 0.133*** 0.121*** 0.212*** 0.191*** -0.022 0.059** 
 (0.026) (0.016) (0.026) (0.016) (0.040) (0.025) (0.037) (0.020) 
Right-to-work 
state 
-0.207*** 0.339*** -0.200*** 0.383***     
 (0.030) (0.014) (0.030) (0.015)     
Education 0.050*** 0.191*** 0.052*** 0.192*** 0.027+ 0.224*** 0.081*** 0.175*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.015) (0.006) (0.012) (0.004) 
Part-time -0.030+ 0.280*** -0.029+ 0.276*** 0.095*** 0.200*** -0.081*** 0.376*** 
 (0.016) (0.032) (0.016) (0.032) (0.029) (0.053) (0.018) (0.039) 
Tenure 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.013*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.027*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
New job 0.061*** -0.209*** 0.065*** -0.201*** 0.089*** -0.325*** 0.085*** -0.115** 
 (0.011) (0.033) (0.011) (0.033) (0.020) (0.052) (0.014) (0.042) 
Public sector -0.013 -0.008 -0.018 -0.063** 0.010 -0.055+ -0.069** -0.098*** 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.035) (0.031) (0.024) (0.026) 
Non-man./prof. 
occ 
-0.116*** -0.541*** -0.115*** -0.603*** -0.083*** -0.759*** -0.152*** -0.562*** 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.020) (0.022) (0.034) (0.016) (0.024) 
Gave informal 
support 
-0.015 0.719*** -0.017 0.706*** -0.057* 0.816*** -0.001 0.690*** 
 (0.013) (0.033) (0.014) (0.033) (0.025) (0.058) (0.016) (0.040) 
Received 
informal support 
-0.211*** 0.179*** -0.209*** 0.185*** -0.336*** 0.925*** -0.103*** -0.288*** 
 (0.015) (0.035) (0.015) (0.035) (0.026) (0.059) (0.018) (0.043) 
Religious 2.677*** 0.580*** 2.665*** 0.582*** 4.299*** 0.845*** 1.926*** 0.515*** 
 (0.114) (0.020) (0.114) (0.020) (0.260) (0.037) (0.135) (0.023) 
Cohabitating 
spouse 
0.303*** 0.744*** 0.308*** 0.761*** 0.391*** 0.914*** 0.212*** 0.650*** 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.039) (0.043) (0.027) (0.030) 
Number of 
children 
0.062*** 0.081*** 0.060*** 0.079*** 0.113*** 0.052*** 0.032*** 0.094*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) 
(log) Family 
income 
0.155*** 1.380*** 0.154*** 1.357*** 0.064*** 1.189*** 0.229*** 1.419*** 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.012) (0.019) 
-2LL 1,395,834 1,395,229 517,918 875,006 
Individuals 5,217 5,217 2,300 2,885 
Observations 14,889 14,889 6,364 8,286 
Notes: Average partial effects reported. Intercepts and year effects omitted to save space. Between-effects refer to time-invariant 
(overall) gaps in giving between free-riders, union members, and non-union workers. Within-effects refer to the time-varying effects 
of change in union status on the outcome variable. For a detailed explanation, see text. Data are weighted. 
Statistical significance: +p < 0.10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (standard errors are in parentheses).
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Table 6. Transition matrix between different union statuses 
 Non-union Free-rider Union member 
Non-union 13,128 196 394 
Free-rider 202 151 80 
Union member  383 56 2,387 
Notes: Data are weighted. 
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Figure 1. Impact of change in unionization on giving across panels   
Panel A: Non-union  union or free-rider 
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Panel B: Union  free-rider or non-union 
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Panel C: Free-rider  union or non-union 
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Light dashed lines are 95 per cent confidence intervals. Data are weighted. 
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Appendix 1. Variable descriptions 
Variable name Description 
Dependent variables:   
Whether donate to charity Whether gave >$25 to a charitable organization in previous year (screening question for amount given) 
(1 = gave; 0 = never gave) 
Amount donated to charity Total giving across all types of charitable organization (logarithm), coded 0 if whether gave is 0. 
 
Independent variables:  
 
 
Union member 
Whether working under a union contract in main job AND member of the union (1 = if so; 0 = 
otherwise) 
 
Free-rider  
 
Whether working under a union contract in main job AND NOT a member (1 = if so; 0 = otherwise) 
 
Control variables: 
 
 
1. Demographic controls:   
Female Gender of household head (1 = female; 0 = male) 
Age  Age of head at time of interview (years) 
African-American Whether self-report African-American (1 = African-American; 0 = non-African-American) 
Hispanic Whether self-report Hispanic (1 = Hispanic; 0 = non-Hispanic) 
Poor health Self-reported health (1 = poor ; 0 = excellent, very good, good, or fair health) 
Urban resident Beale-Ross Rural-urban continuum  
Right-to-work state 
Whether reside in state with right-to-work laws (1 = resides in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma (2001 and after only), South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, or Wyoming; 0 = all other states) 
Education 
 
Years of education 
2. Job and workplace controls:   
Part-time  If worked fewer than 1560 hours of paid work over the reference year 
Tenure in current job Tenure in current job (years) 
New job Whether working for a new employer since date of previous interview (1 = moved employer; 0 = same 
employer) 
Public sector Whether works in the public sector (1 = federal government, state government, local government and 
public school system; 0 = private sector, non-government, and other) 
Non-managerial/professional 
occupation 
Whether occupation is non-managerial/professional (1 = service occupations, sales and office 
occupations, farming, fishing, and forestry occupations , construction, extraction, and maintenance 
occupations, productions, transport, and material occupations; 0 = managerial and professional 
occupations) 
3. Social capital indicators:  
Gave informal support Whether gave financial support to relative or non-relative (1=gave; 0 = did not) 
Received informal support  Whether received financial support from relative or non-relative (1 = received; 0 = did not) 
Religious  
 
Reported religious affiliation (1 = yes; 0=no)  
4. Household controls:   
Presence of cohabiting spouse Whether reporting cohabiting  (1 = cohabiting spouse, married or not;  
0 = otherwise) 
Number of children Number of children in family unit under 17 
Family income Net family income from all sources (logarithm) 
 
